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OIL AND GAS-CONSTRUCTION OF LEASE-DRY HOLE AND CESSATION OF 
PRODUCTION CLAUSE-Newman Brothers Drilling Company obtained an oil 
and gas lease on land subject to a prior lease held by Stanolind Oil and Gas 
Company and under which a well commenced within the primary term 
had been completed as a dry hole after the expiration of the primary term. 
Forty-nine days after completion of the dry hole Stanolind commenced and 
completed a second well as a producer. Upon suit by Newman in trespass to 
try title and for declaratory judgment the court of civil appeals, reversing 
the trial court, held that the lease under which Stanolind claimed had 
terminated with the completion of the first well as a dry hole. On appeal 
to the supreme court, held, reversed, two judges dissenting.1 Stanolind Oil 
and Gas Company v. Newman Drilling Company, (Tex. 1957) 305 S.W. 
(2d) 169. 
Stanolind claimed under a typical "unless" lease.2 and the court's hold-
ing turned on the construction and application of the following two 
provisions: 
"2. Subject to the provisions herein contained, this lease shall be for 
a term of five (5) years from this date (called 'primary term') and as 
1 The dissenters argued that the 30 and 60-day clauses were mutually exclusive and 
that since the 30-day clause specifically dealt with drilling at the expiration of the 
primary term, the general language of the 60-day clause was not applicable. 
2 The "unless" drilling clause was that if operations are not commenced within one 
year the lease shall terminate unless delay rentals are paid as provided therein; and the 
commencement of such operations may be further deferred in the same manner for 
successive periods of 12 months each during the primary term. 
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long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced from said land 
hereunder .... 
"5. If prior to discovery of oil or gas on said land Lessee should drill 
a dry hole or holes thereon, or if after discovery of oil or gas the produc-
tion thereof should cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate 
if Lessee commences additional drilling or reworking operations· with-
in sixty (60) days thereafter or (if it be within the primary term) com-
mences or resumes the payment or tender of rentals on or before the 
rental paying date next ensuing after the expiration of three months 
from date of completion of dry hole or cessation of production. If at 
the expiration of the primary term oil, gas or other mineral is not 
being produced on said land but Lessee is then engaged in drilling or 
re-working operations thereon, the lease shall remain in force so long 
as operations are prosecuted with no cessation of more than thirty (30) 
consecutive days, and if they result in the production of oil, gas or 
other minerals so long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is pro-
duced from said land." 
Although the second sentence of provision 5, the 30-day clause, had been 
narrowly construed in Rogers v. Osborn3 as allowing only the completion 
of the very well commenced within the primary term and not to authorize 
the drilling of additional wells, the court in the principal case found in 
the first sentence of provision 5, the 60-day clause, authorization for the 
same continuous drilling which had previously been denied in the 30-day 
clause. The court attributed this continuous drilling concept to the dry 
hole clause by taking four steps. (1) The iteration in Rogers v. Osborn that, 
"The conditions contained in the two separate sentences should not be 
jumbled,"4 was limited to the facts of that case. (2) The initial qualifying 
phrase of the habendum clause, provision 2, "Subject to the other pro-
visions herein contained," was held to engraft all of provision 5 onto the 
entire habendum clause and thereby to extend the lease. (3) Since no dry 
hole had been completed when the primary term expired, the 60-day clause 
was inapplicable, but drilling operations being prosecuted at the expira-
tion of that term qualified to extend the lease under the 30-day clause 
alone. (4) Since the lease was extended by these operations and since their 
completion resulted in a dry hole, that dry hole occurred within the life 
of the lease, and the 60-day clause was then applicable to authorize addi-
tional drilling. The logic of this reasoning is unassailable, and the result 
will probably meet with the wide approval of the oil industry.5 
a 152 Tex. 540 at 546, 261 S.W. (2d) 311 (1953). The second use of the term "opera-
tions" in the second sentence of an identical provision 5 was held to refer to "the con-
tinuous prosecution of the very operation being engaged in by the lessees upon the 
expiration of .the primary term." These provisions or very similar ones have also been 
scrutinized in St. Louis Royalty Co. v. Continental Oil Co., (5th Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 
778, and Continental Oil Co. v. Boston-Texas Land Trust, (5th Cir. 1955) 221 F. 
(2d) 124. 
4 Martin, J., in his concurring opinion in the principal case at the appeals court 
level, 296 S.W. (2d) 567 at 574, did not jumble the sentences and reached the opposite 
conclusion from that of the supreme court. 
5 See 5TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 361, where Hawley 
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This particular form of a dry hole clause, however, when interpreted 
in the light of its historical and legal context, is incapable of the con-
struction attributed to it and is at most ambiguous and subject to the 
general rule of construction that ambiguity should be resolved in favor 
of the lessor.6 The historical context of a particular clause of an oil and 
gas lease has long been recognized as a pertinent consideration when the 
judiciary attempts to interpret that clause.7 Provision 5 represents an 
attempt to amalgamate the attributes of three different leasing concepts 
with diverse pedigrees and to express them in one paragraph. (1) The 30-
day clause was developed to afford relief to the lessee who commenced 
drilling a well within the primary term, but who completed it after the 
primary term had expired.8 This clause allowed him to complete such 
a well and to hold the lease if there were production.9 (2) The dry hole 
clause was an attempt to define the obligation of the lessee to develop 
the lease or to make delay rental payments when the lessee had completed 
a dry hole before the last year of the primary term.10 Generally, the dry 
hole clause extended to the lessee the option of drilling another well 
or resuming the payment of delay rentals in order to hold the lease.11 
(3) The final problem involved the rights of the parties when the lease 
was being held by production and that production ceased, either before 
or after the expiration of the primary term. Generally, in the absence 
of a contract provision to the contrary, the lease terminated when produc-
tion ceased after the primary term expired unless production was resumed 
within a reasonable time.12 The cessation of production within the primary 
term was considered similar to the completion of a dry hole within the 
primary term with the same problems arising. Provision 5 in the principal 
C. Kerr, General Counsel for Skelly Oil Co., predicts the holding of the principal case 
and interprets the 30-day clause not to be limited in its application to the very operations 
being engaged in at the expiration of the primary term, notwithstanding Rogers v. Osborn. 
6 Zeppa v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 113 S.W. (2d) 612, error 
refused n.r.e. 
7 2 SUMMERS, THE LAw OF OIL AND GAS, perm. ed., 169 (1938). 
s In Kentucky, Simpson v. Buckners Admr., 247 Ky. 564, 57 S.W. {2d) 464 (1933); 
Montana, Consolidated Gas Co. v. Rieckhoff, 116 Mont. 1, 151 P. (2d) 588 (1944); Okla-
homa, Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P. (2d) 419 (1932); and West Virginia, Eastern 
Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836 (1909), such relief is unnecessary, for a 
lessee has the right to complete any well commenced within the primary term. But 
see 19 MICH. L. R.Ev. 161 at 182 (1920). 
9 The original 30-day clause was to effect the same result as permitted by the 
states in note 8 supra without any provisions. A further innovation was the "continuous 
drilling operations clause" which extended this saving aspect to include additional 
drilling after the well was completed as a dry hole after the primary term bad expired. 
10 See Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304 (1923). See also Masterson, 
"A Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law," 4m ANNUAL INSTITllTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND 
TAXATION 219 at 268 (1953). 
11 See WALKER, CAsES ON OIL AND GAS 567 (1949). 
12 See 2 S,UMMERS, THE LAw OF OIL AND GAS, perm. ed., §305 (1938). 
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case attempts to solve both problems by allowing additional drilling 
within 60 days and by extending to the lessee after production ceases 
within the primary term the same option which is available when a dry 
hole is completed within the primary term.13 In the principal case14 the 
court rightly says that the 60-day clause deals with the problems of both 
completion of a dry hole and cessation of production. The parenthetical 
expression (if it be within the primary term) appearing in the 60-day 
clause indicates to the court that both of these events may occur after 
the end of the primary term: "The lessee is specifically given the right to 
keep the lease alive by resuming payment of rentals in either situation 
provided it occurs before the end of the primary term. By necessary impli-
cation the lease may be kept in force by the additional drilling or re-
working operations in either fact situation whether occurring within or 
after the end of the primary term .... The parenthetical expression shows 
beyond any question that the parties contemplated that the provision 
would be effective both during and after such term." Historical context, 
however, indicates that the real purpose of the dry hole clause is to allow 
the drilling of an additional well to comply with the development require-
ment and to substitute for payment of delay rentals. Since payment of 
delay rentals is never allowed to extend the primary term but is capable 
only of holding the lease during the primary term, drilling that is to 
substitute for delay rental must retain these same characteristics and can-
not extend the primary term. Drilling, however, may be a substitute for 
royalty production. Since production results in royalty payments to the 
lessor which, unlike delay rental payments, are capable of extending the 
primary term, drilling after production ceases, as a substitute for produc-
tion, may then extend the primary term. Drilling after completion of a 
dry hole and drilling after production ceases are two separate situations; 
drilling should take on the character of that which it replaces.15 The 
parenthetical clause, which therefore has no significance where a dry hole 
is completed, is an attempt to remedy the situation created by the cessa-
tion of production within the primary term by extending the same option 
of paying delay rental afforded by the completion of a dry hole within 
13 "Experience has demonstrated that limiting this clause to a dry hole does not 
adequately protect the lessee. A similar provision is necessary when a well capable of 
producing is completed, but is shut in for lack of a market; or where production starts 
but then ceases. . . ." Masterson, "A Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law," 4th ANNUAL 
INSTITtITE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 219 at 269 (1953). 
H Principal case at 174. 
15 The identification of a substitute with the capabilities and limitations of that 
which it replaces was adopted to characterize shut-in royalty; Freeman v. Magnolia 
Petroleum Co., 141 Tex. 274, 171 S.W. (2d) 339 (1943); and to determine whether an oil 
payment was royalty or bonus, State Nat. Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 
509, 143 S.W. (2d) 757 (1940); and to determine whether funds were royalty or delay 
rental, Morriss v. First National Bank of Mission, (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) 249 S.W. (2d) 
269, error refused n.r.e. 
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the primary term.16 It was never intended to permit drilling after a dry 
hole to extend the primary term as does drilling after production ceases. 
To allow this is to nullify both the agreement for development within the 
primary term and the 30-day drillng operations savings clause, and would 
-convert many dry hole clauses into continuous drilling clauses.17 Combined 
with this general historical background is the specific legal history of this 
particular provision in Rogers v. Osborn where the court held that the 
110-day clause was not a continuous drilling operations clause as the lessee 
-contended. To imply now the desired result in a dry hole clause which 
:also defined the rights of the parties when production -ceased within the 
primary term is to ignore both historical and legal context of the clauses 
as well as to refuse to recognize the ambiguity in the wording itself. This 
is not to say that the parties cannot contract for such a result. However, 
the history of this clause and the purpose for which it was created and 
modified combine with the general rule that ambiguity should be resolved 
in favor of the lessor to demand that a court require a clear and unam-
biguous expression of such contractual intention.18 No such expression can 
be found in the principal case. 
16 See note 13 supra. 
17 See note 9 supra. 
James L. Burton 
18 In referring to extensions of primary terms, the court said in J. J. Fagan & Co. 
v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674 at 681, 226 N .W. 653 (1929), "In fairness to lessors, extension 
provisions should be made plain." 
